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ABSTRACT 
 
Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the process of taking another’s perspective. 
Anthropomorphism can be seen as the extension of ToM to non-human entities. This review 
examines the literature concerning ToM and anthropomorphism in relation to individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), specifically addressing the questions of how and why those 
on the spectrum both show an increased interest for anthropomorphism and may even show 
improved ToM abilities when judging the mental states of anthropomorphic characters. This 
review highlights that while individuals with ASD traditionally show deficits on a wide range of 
ToM tests, such as recognizing facial emotions, such ToM deficits may be ameliorated if the 
stimuli presented is cartoon or animal-like rather than human form. Individuals with ASD show a 
greater interest in anthropomorphic characters and process the features of these characters using 
methods typically reserved for human stimuli. Personal accounts of individuals with ASD also 
suggest they may identify more closely with animals than other humans. It is shown how the 
social motivations hypothesized to underlie the anthropomorphizing of non-human targets may 
lead those on the spectrum to seek social connections and therefore gain ToM experience and 
expertise amongst unlikely sources.  
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It took me a long time to figure out that I see things about animals other people don't. And it wasn't until I 
was in my forties that I finally realized I had one big advantage over the feedlot owners who were hiring 
me to manage their animals: being autistic. Autism made school and social life hard, but it made animals 
easy (Grandin & Johnson, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Anthropomorphism is the ascription of human features to non-human entities (Epley, 
Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), and it often occurs when non-human entities are perceived as 
behaving both intentionally and unpredictably (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). Perhaps one 
reason individuals are more likely to anthropomorphize entities that are unpredictable is that 
human behavior can be equally difficult to predict, governed by a complex system of non-
observable cognitions, beliefs, and motivations (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Luckily, early in life 
we learn to attend to nuances in behavior that allow for an intrinsic tracking of other’s intentions 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Thus, when non-human entities behave invariably, we reflexively 
attempt to make sense of that behavior, by tracing it back to a particular goal or purpose.  
The act of delineating a person’s goal or purpose involves using theory of mind (ToM). 
ToM is a form of social cognition that refers to the ascription and recognition of thoughts, 
emotions and beliefs to the self and others and to recognize that another’s perspectives are 
different to our own (Baron-Cohen, 1999). When people ponder the goals or motivations of non-
human entities, they are essentially using ToM. Humanizing the behavior of non-human entities 
is a pathway towards using ToM to understand their motivations or intentions, thus 
anthropomorphism and ToM are closely connected (Epley et al., 2007). Areas of the brain such 
as the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), which activates in accordance with ToM, also activates 
when anthropomorphizing (Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007) and when rationalizing the 
behavior of both humans and animals (Spunt, Ellsworth, & Adolphs, 2017). Additionally, the 
  
more a person anthropomorphizes, the larger the areas of the brain that are responsible for ToM 
processing (Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, & Rees, 2014), highlighting the connection between 
anthropomorphism and ToM. 
There is some evidence that ToM and, by association, anthropomorphism, reflect a more 
general predictive strategy people use to process unpredictability in the environment, 
independent of any one agent’s human-like properties, called predictive encoding (Friston & 
Frith, 2015). For instance, in the “uncanny valley,” when a stimuli is presented as human, such 
as a humanoid robot, yet their behavior is too predictable or mechanical, numerous error signals 
are transmitted, and as a result it is difficult to predict the robot’s actions (Saygin, Chaminade, 
Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012). Thus, at its most basic level, it is likely that ToM, and in turn 
anthropomorphism, is triggered through a more general recognition of behavioral patterns 
through a process of predictive encoding.  
However, it is also true that anthropomorphism is not simply the mind engaging in more 
general predictive strategies, but it also involves applying a human schema to better understand 
non-human agents. This process can be observed when individuals take the Social Attribution 
Task, in which people increasingly attribute human behavioral patterns to animated shapes 
(Heider & Simmel, 1944). By humanizing non-human agents, individuals are better equipped to 
utilize predictive encoding strategies. As people have extensive knowledge of the types of goals 
that underlie such behaviors in human agents, the more one humanizes an unpredictable gadget, 
the easier it becomes to predict, said gadget’s future behavior (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). 
This helps explain why, in contrast, dehumanizing an agent, such as the robot in the “uncanny 
valley,” leads to particularly strong predictive encoding disruptions (Saygin, Chaminade, 
Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012). 
  
Arguably the largest store of knowledge about human agency comes from an 
understanding of one’s own behavioral antecedents and outcomes, which can aid in the 
representation of what may underlie a person’s actions. Humphrey (1984) refers to this as 
“reflexive consciousness” or the ability to map the externalizing behaviors of others onto the 
internal experience of the self. Evidence for reflexive consciousness within the brain has come 
through the discovery of a mirror neural network, which supports the activation of one’s own 
motoric brain regions even when only passively viewing the actions of others (Kohler et al., 
2002), as well as a “default network” in cortical midline structures of the brain, which activates 
in relation to both self-related and socially-related thoughts (Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 
2007). Both networks reveal the important role self-conceptualization plays when both 
processing other’s actions and representing their mental states.  
Therefore, it is likely that one reason people anthropomorphize is that they are not only 
“humanizing” an unfamiliar agent, but more specifically they are personalizing the agent to 
activate self-representations and simulate the other’s experience. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
critical effect following ToM and anthropomorphic engagement with another includes perceiving 
that agent as more similar to the self (Epley et al., 2007), viewing them more empathically 
(Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), and displaying a greater desire to interact with them in 
socially desirable ways (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al., 2010). As we develop expertise in using ToM 
to predict the actions of others, and even ourselves, we become most capable of understanding 
non-human agents by attributing human motivations to their behaviors, therefore giving rise to 
anthropomorphism (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). But what if a person does not develop 
such an interest and expertise in human cognition? What if they struggle to self-reference? Can 
they anthropomorphize?  
  
Such questions are particularly pertinent with regard to autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
a condition in which affected individuals show, in comparison to those who are neurotypical 
(NT), deficits in ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Kana et al., 2015), poor self-referential 
cognition (Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007), decreased mirror neural 
activity (Oberman et al., 2005) and weakened connections within the default network (Weng et 
al., 2010), all of which are mechanisms conjectured to play an intrinsic role in 
anthropomorphizing. As will be explored throughout this review, despite these differences, 
which would presumably contribute to a particularly weakened ability to anthropomorphize, 
individuals with ASD appear to display an affinity for anthropomorphism and an even stronger 
performance on ToM tasks when agents are non-human.  Explanations for relative strengths 
within this population in relation to the processing of anthropomorphic ToM will be discussed. 
Autism Spectrum Disorder  
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that affects approximately 1 in 68 individuals 
(CDC, 2014). Those affected possess atypical social and communicative styles, and restricted, 
repetitive behaviors and interests (APA, 2013). Some believe that these two symptoms are 
somewhat separable (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014), as individuals with ASD often have significant 
variation in symptom profiles (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007).  There are several prominent theories 
commonly used to explain the mechanisms believed to underpin ASD. Among them are the 
Empathizing/Systemizing theory (Baron‐ Cohen, 2009), the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning 
theory (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006), and the Social Motivation theory 
(Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). These three theories largely center upon 
the hypothesized mechanisms which underlie the social and perceptual differences found in 
ASD, each will now be briefly explored.  
  
The Empathizing/Systemizing theory of ASD is comprised of two elements; an 
empathetic/ToM deficit often referred to as “mind blindness,” and a penchant towards systematic 
stimuli conforming to rule-based logic, such as numbers or mechanical objects (Baron-Cohen, 
2009). Evidence of empathy deficits within ASD include cognitive difficulties such as failure to 
pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), and affective impairments such as 
reduced ability to process facial emotions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 
2001), or poor automatic tracking of non-verbal cues (Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015).  
The systemizing element of the theory refers to the ability to understand and use rule-based 
reasoning or logic, which Baron-Cohen (2009) connects with an increased competence those 
with ASD often demonstrate in domains such as science and mathematics. However, as 
understanding social systems requires more “gestalt” or holistic interpretations, a penchant for 
systemizing could impede development in other areas. Indeed, research suggests that tendencies 
towards empathizing and systemizing have a strong inverse relationship in clinical samples 
(Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2013), indicating that those with ASD may 
be approaching empathy tasks systematically. However, as will be highlighted in this review, 
several studies show those on the spectrum do not have a global deficit towards empathizing, as 
this theory suggests, yet this ability is intact when social stimuli is anthropomorphic rather than 
human.  
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory (EPF) (Mottron et al., 2006) instead argues that 
people with ASD can indeed process globally, even at times showing strengths relative to 
controls (Perreault, Gurnsey, Dawson, Mottron, & Bertone, 2011). However, it is hypothesized 
that the heightened perceptual sensitivities to lower order stimuli demonstrated by superior visual 
acuity (Gliga et al., 2015), sensitivity to musical pitch (Bonnel et al., 2003), motion perception 
  
(Foss-Feig, Tadin, Schauder, & Cascio, 2013) and even tactile sensitivity (for a review see Ben-
Sasson et al., (2009)), may lead to significant processing differences which may have 
downstream effects. For instance, as those with ASD show a diminished sensitivity to complex 
stimuli (Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic, & Faubert, 2005; Boer, Eussen, & Vroomen, 2013) it may be 
that they increasingly rely on their enhanced lower-level sensory perception and thus struggle 
updating their processing strategies (Zaidel, Goin-Kochel, & Angelaki, 2015).  
Heightened discriminatory abilities in relation to low-level object features in a domain 
(i.e. pitch, letters, digits or 2-D visuo-perceptual properties), may also underlie the circumscribed 
interests (CIs) in relation to a defined class of units often found to exist in this population 
(Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009). CIs in ASD have been found 
to be particularly intense, interfering and idiosyncratic compared to NTs (Anthony et al., 2013). 
The role of CIs in ASD with regards to processing advantages and disadvantages are themselves 
somewhat paradoxical in this population. For one, a person with ASD’s exposure to areas related 
to CIs can in many instances lead to “savant” type abilities in which a person shows extreme 
talent in relation to knowledge of a particular domain (Happé & Frith, 2010). However, research 
indicates that the presence of CI related stimuli can divert attention from social stimuli , and 
increase perseverative behaviors (Sasson, Turner‐ Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 2008). 
Some research indicates that in certain situations, such as when both a NT peer and child with 
ASD are interacting in relation to the child’s CI, such as playing with a toy boat or plane, social 
initiation is enhanced (Boyd, Conroy, Mancil, Nakao, & Alter, 2007). Children with ASD have 
also been shown to be more likely to follow another’s social gaze when directed towards CI 
stimuli (Thorup, Kleberg, & Falck-Ytter, 2017). This indicates that while when unmonitored, CIs 
can divert social attention, they can also be mechanisms for inducing positive social behaviors,  
  
It has also been conjectured that the heightened sensory perception, and the presence of 
CIs, may carry a specifically social cost to those with the condition (Unruh et al., 2016). Social 
Motivation theory (SM) of ASD (Chevallier et al., 2012), argues that the population’s empathy 
and perceptual differences may not receive the types of neurohormonal “rewards” typically 
experienced when interacting socially with others (Chaminade, Da Fonseca, Rosset, Cheng, & 
Deruelle, 2015). Instead, stimuli representing restricted interests have been shown to activate 
reward circuitry that in NTs are stimulated by social stimuli (Foss-Feig et al., 2016; Grelotti et 
al., 2005). While causality is difficult to infer, those that prescribe to a “social first” model of 
ASD believe that the enhanced ability to discriminate lower level stimuli may in part develop 
due to an absence of typical social development, such as the ability to engage in joint attention 
(Mundy, Sullivan, & Mastergeorge, 2009). As young children with ASD are impaired in joint 
attention in the first years of life (Charman, 2003), and as joint attention is thought to underlie 
ToM (Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015), it may be that lower level perceptual strengths develop 
in place of skills such as ToM which develop through more social learning methods. Subsequent 
difficulties with skills like ToM have been shown to longitudinally impair social functioning and 
peer relations (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011), and thus poor ToM may negatively influence 
a person with ASD’s motivation later in life to engage in social interactions. Research indicates 
that adults with ASD, who have been shown to experience increased rates of loneliness, 
depression and anxiety, and cite social reasoning difficulties as a significant source of their 
isolation (Jobe & Williams White, 2007). Thus, an aspect of SM theory involves the possibility 
that decreased social rewards processing may be in part a downstream consequence of the 
negative social experiences those with ASD symptoms often endure (Wood & Gadow, 2010). 
  
Both the increased salience of lower level stimuli, particularly those that align with 
circumscribed interests (CI), and the decreased salience of non-systematic, social stimuli that 
may impact social motivation (SM), could help explain why people with ASD often have 
difficulties using ToM, which necessitates gestalt processing through complex modalities (for 
instance nonverbal body language coupled with explicit vocal communication), and socially 
directed attention (Frith & Frith, 2006). As ToM deficits have been shown to persist throughout 
development (Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013) and correspond heavily to ASD 
symptom severity (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2017), it is an important mechanism for 
understanding ASD symptomology and trajectory. As research indicates that current ToM 
interventions demonstrate poor transfer into real life settings (Marraffa & Araba, 2016), finding 
ways in which ToM may be intrinsically rewarding to those with ASD, such as through 
anthropomorphism, could be a vital tool for researchers and community stakeholders alike. The 
ability and affinity to anthropomorphize in those with ASD will be explored in relation to the 
above theories throughout the remainder of this review.  
Anthropomorphism and ASD  
There is some evidence that people with ASD, despite ToM deficits in relation to human 
stimuli, have intact or even enhanced ToM processing in relation to anthropomorphic stimuli 
(these will be explored in more detail in subsequent sections). Theoretically, there are several 
reasons why such improvements may exist, and these will be discussed in connection with the 
three tenants of anthropomorphism from the Epley et al., (2007) model.  
In the model’s first tenet, it is stated that individuals are more likely to anthropomorphize 
when they have an increased motivation for sociability, and indeed individuals with increased 
levels of loneliness are more likely to anthropomorphize pets (Epley et al., 2007), robots (Lee, 
  
Jung, Kim, & Kim, 2006), and even smart phones (Wang, 2017). Research indicates that people 
with ASD are particularly vulnerable to loneliness and thus the anthropomorphizing of non-
human agents may function as a social outlet of sorts. For instance, adults with a high degree of 
ASD related traits were found to be no different than controls in their desire for companionship, 
but reported significantly higher ratings of loneliness which they attributed to their lack of social 
understanding (Jobe & Williams White, 2007).  Evidence of fewer social networks (Mazurek, 
2014), along with an increased perception of the self as a poor social actor (Vickerstaff, Heriot, 
Wong, Lopes, & Dossetor, 2007) may contribute to the elevated levels of social anxiety present 
within the population (for a review see MacNeil, Lopes, and Minnes, (2009)). As social 
differences may isolate those with ASD from peers and/or result in negative outcomes, 
anthropomorphizing non-human entities may allow for social engagement with less emotional 
risk. In this way, interactions with anthropomorphic characters may become more socially 
motivating, in line with SM theory. 
In the second Epley et al., (2007) tenet, individuals are found to increasingly 
anthropomorphize a non-human entity to increase efficacy, and a desire for efficacy is 
heightened when the non-human’s behavior is increasingly unpredictable. One reason why 
individuals with ASD may increasingly anthropomorphize to increase efficacy is that properties 
of non-human creatures may map onto CIs, and are thus intrinsically rewarding to those with the 
condition (Dichter et al., 2010). Indeed, there have been several reported cases of children with 
ASD having restricted interests in relation to cartoons and animals (Grelotti et al., 2005; South, 
Ozonoff, & McMahon, 2005; Turner-Brown, Lam, Holtzclaw, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2011), and in 
this way anthropomorphism may stem from a desire to increase efficacy in their restricted area of 
expertise. Additionally, the exaggerated physical appearance and motion of animals (Borgi & 
  
Cirulli, 2016) and cartoons (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987) may heighten the perception of 
unpredictability in such agents, which leads to a desire for increased efficacy. Conversely, more 
nuanced behavioral cues indicating unpredictability when in human form, such as subtle changes 
in facial expression or gaze direction, may be more easily overlooked by those with ASD (Rump, 
Giovannelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009).  
Thirdly, anthropomorphism is enhanced through the perception of similarities between 
the self and the other. Individuals with ASD have been shown to have a diminished physical 
sense of self (Lombardo et al., 2010), and are also less sensitive to the physical irregularities of 
non-human agents (Kumazaki et al., 2017; Kuriki, Tamura, Igarashi, Kato, & Nakano, 2016).  
 
Thus, it may be that a diminished physical sense of self allows individuals with ASD to view 
themselves in less human and more anthropomorphic ways, a viewpoint suggested in 
experiential accounts by those with the condition. The increased social processing of 
anthropomorphic agents may reflect an elicitation of agent knowledge that views the self as 
“other than human” (Bergenmar, Rosqvist, & Lönngren, 2015).  
To assess these claims, research investigating elements of social processing in individuals 
with ASD regarding human versus anthropomorphic stimuli will be discussed. In the following 
sections, studies examining the social attention and processing of human versus anthropomorphic 
stimuli will be explored. Processing of anthropomorphic vs human face and motion processing 
will first be discussed. Secondly, this review will explore how increased engagement with 
anthropomorphic stimuli can lead to ToM gains, along with a discussion of ASD interventions 
utilizing anthropomorphic engagement through animal and cartoon-based interventions. Finally, 
  
possible explanations for enhanced anthropomorphic interest, engagement, and social processing 
will be explored, along with implications for practitioners and future research directions.  
Anthropomorphic vs Human Face Processing 
In this section one of the underlying mechanisms for understanding ToM, face processing 
and attention to eye gaze, will be examined. Aspects of face processing that differ in NTs and 
those with ASD are first explored, and explanations for these differences discussed. Next, several 
studies are presented that demonstrate intact face processing in this population in relation to 
anthropomorphic characters, specifically cartoons, androids, and animals. Explanations for this 
differential processing and its implications for understanding ToM are discussed.  
Typical vs Atypical Face Processing 
One of the integral components of ToM is conjecturing what a person is thinking by 
processing what their face is expressing (Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992). It is thought that 
individuals begin to hone this ability immediately following birth, as infants are particularly 
interested in protofaces, or indistinct face-like shapes (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 
1991), and can immediately mimic facial expressions (Meltzoff, 1999). However, prolonged 
exposure to faces as “special” stimuli are likely responsible for the preference young children 
develop towards species-specific faces (Sugita, 2008), which in time develops into an expertise 
for species-specific facial recognition and facial emotion processing (Scherf, Behrmann, 
Humphreys, & Luna, 2007).  
Infants at risk for ASD have been shown to also orient towards faces, contrary to popular 
conceptions of ASD stemming from a nascent decreased social interest (Elsabbagh et al., 2013). 
Klerk, Gliga, Charman, and Johnson (2014) also found that at 7 months of age, infants at risk for 
ASD spent longer than is typical gazing at faces, yet this was longitudinally linked to poorer 
  
facial recognition abilities. It is conjectured that the prolonged gazing at faces in infants at risk 
for ASD reflects piece-meal rather than holistic processing, meaning that rather than processing 
faces as “special” stimuli, they may be processing them more in line with detailed objects. This 
may explain why NT children at age two are better able to differentiate human versus monkey 
faces, yet children with ASD do not develop this ability until  3-4 years of age (Chawarska & 
Volkmar, 2007). It may be that while individuals with ASD gaze for longer at faces, they are not 
processing faces in a way that leads to typical facial recognition gains, which itself relies on 
holistic processing (Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011). However, as will be discussed, it may be 
that those with ASD instead develop an ability to process anthropomorphic faces in typical ways, 
which has implications for social processing mechanisms in this population.  
Holistic Anthropomorphic Face Processing 
It is conjectured that aspects of ToM depend on the ability to holistically process faces 
due to a need to rapidly detect what may be a nuanced change in facial expression. To achieve 
this, individuals are thought to holistically compare a person’s face with a facial prototype, 
which allows for the distinct properties of a face to become salient (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & 
Tanaka, 1998). A significant body of research suggests that individuals with ASD show both 
qualitative and quantitative differences in the way they holistically process human faces (Tang et 
al., 2015). For instance, in a study by Pavlova et al. (2017), individuals with ASD were asked to 
process images of food which were arranged to look like faces. Unlike typically developed 
individuals, those with ASD showed significant difficulty recognizing that the food was arranged 
to look like a face, indicating a detailed, piece-meal interpretation of the stimuli.  
One method for measuring holistic face processing is to measure the facial inversion 
effect, which refers to the significant difficulty NTs display when processing inverted rather than 
  
upright faces (Leder & Bruce, 2000), indicating disruption when a face does not conform to its 
typical configural pattern (Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2011). Research indicates that 
individuals with ASD show a decreased inversion effect when viewing human faces (Falck‐
Ytter, 2008; Senju, Kikuchi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 2008; Vida et al., 2013). However, 
there are several studies indicating that individuals with ASD may demonstrate the inversion 
effect when faces are anthropomorphic, indicating that they are processing them holistically. For 
instance, an investigation by Rosset et al. (2008) tested facial emotion recognition in children 
with ASD and NT controls using both cartoon drawings and human photographs of inverted and 
upright faces. They found that NT children showed the inversion effect for both cartoon and 
human faces, meaning that their holistic facial representations were significantly disrupted when 
both types of stimuli were inverted. However, individuals with ASD did not show this effect 
when viewing inverted human faces; instead, they demonstrated the inversion effect only when 
processing cartoon faces. Interestingly, follow up research by Rosset et al. (2010) again tested 
the inversion effect in cartoon versus human faces, but this time participants were asked to 
discriminate facial features of stimuli. Results showed that NT participants demonstrated the 
inversion effect only when viewing human faces. In contrast, participants with ASD did not 
show a preference for either real or cartoon faces, performing equally in each condition, and 
showing a reduced inversion effect compared to controls. Together, these results illustrate a trend 
in which anthropomorphizing social stimuli can at times be advantageous for those with ASD. 
While anthropomorphism does not always lead to processing gains, as shown in Rosset et al. 
(2010), non-human presentation does not appear to interfere with ASD processing patterns as it 
does with controls.  
  
As individuals with ASD have been shown to report a heightened engagement with 
cartoons (Kuo, Orsmond, Coster, & Cohn, 2014), it may be that the cartoon rather than human 
inversion effect reflects a greater degree of elicited agent knowledge in relation to this kind of 
stimuli. For instance, research indicates that the inversion effect is significantly strengthened 
when individuals view faces reflective of their own age and race (Ding, Fu, & Lee, 2014), 
indicating that elicited agent knowledge enhances the anthropomorphism of similar facial 
stimuli. Additionally, the lack of inversion effect towards human faces may reflect a decreased 
anthropomorphizing of human faces, possibly due to a decreased ability to elicit agent 
knowledge in relation to humans. This is surprising, as individuals with ASD are indeed human 
and undoubtedly have significantly more experience with humans. However, as the Epley et al., 
(2007) model also posits, a desire for sociality interacts with the elicitation of agent knowledge. 
Thus, it may be that decreased salience for human faces, due to a possible social disengagement 
with human faces, does not interfere with cartoon processing. In the following section, further 
researching demonstrating intact processing of anthropomorphic rather than human faces will be 
discussed in relation to neural evidence on individuals with ASD.  
Fusiform Face Area (FFA) 
One mechanism implicated in the holistic processing of faces is an acquired activation in 
the fusiform face area (FFA) when viewing facial stimuli. The FFA is a brain region located in 
the right hemisphere, where “holistic” processing is thought to occur, and this region is notably 
activated when NT individuals view faces (Carlei, Framorando, Burra, & Kerzel, 2017). 
However, as shown in research testing individuals with particular areas of expertise, it can also 
activate when a person views various non-face stimuli of significant personal interest and 
experience (Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). Evidence will now be discussed which shows activation in 
  
the FFA in response to anthropomorphic rather than human stimuli, which provides further 
evidence that individuals with ASD may have differentially developed anthropomorphic rather 
than human expertise.  
Research on brain regions such as the fusiform gyrus (FG), which houses the FFA, 
indicates that the development of facial expertise develops over time. For instance, in children 
ages five to eight the FG has been shown to be sensitive to objects, but not faces; however, this 
pattern reverses by the time children reach 11-14 (Scherf et al., 2007). By early to mid-
adolescence, the volume of the FG has significantly increased, and this volume is correlated with 
a person’s ability to recognize and remember faces (Golarai et al., 2007). It is thought that the 
developed activation of the FG, and in particular the FFA, in response to faces corresponds to an 
increased necessity to sensitively processing facial information, leading adolescents and adults to 
become face reading “experts” (Gauthier, Tarr, et al., 2000). This is significant regarding ToM, 
as a developed expertise in facial recognition allows for nuanced interpretations when reading 
emotional expressions (Schmitgen, Walter, Drost, Rückl, & Schnell, 2016).Individuals with ASD 
demonstrate hypoactivation in the FG and FFA when looking at specifically human faces 
(Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Humphreys, Hasson, Avidan, Minshew, & Behrmann, 
2008; Pierce & Redcay, 2008). However, the volume of the FG in individuals with ASD is not 
smaller than NT counterparts, which implies that non-facial stimuli may instead activate this 
region (Whyte, Behrmann, Minshew, Garcia, & Scherf, 2016).  
It may be that FG activity is less impaired, or even intact, in individuals with ASD when 
social stimuli are anthropomorphic rather than purely human, particularly when stimuli represent 
a restricted interest. Grelotti et al., (2005) measured FFA activation in a child and adolescent 
with ASD, one with a heightened interest in the cartoon Digimon, and one without, along with a 
  
NT child. During a visual recognition task, participants were shown pictures featuring familiar 
human faces, unfamiliar human faces, cartoon characters from the show Digimon, and common 
objects. While the NT participant experienced activation in the FFA only when viewing human 
faces, the participant with ASD who watched Digimon showed FFA activation only when 
viewing pictures of Digimon. The participant with ASD without a preference for Digimon 
showed hypoactivation in the FFA when viewing both faces and Digimon, and instead showed 
the greatest amount of activation when viewing common objects. This suggests that familiar 
stimuli related to restricted interests may preferentially recruit the FFA in individuals with ASD, 
in contrast to human facial stimuli.  
Interestingly, research testing ASD participant responses to non-familiar 
anthropomorphic faces, which were, at best, only tangentially related to restricted interests, have 
also been shown to elicit FFA activation in those with this condition. Jung, Strother, Feil-Seifer, 
and Hutsler (2016), measured the neural responses of children with ASD and controls to 
unfamiliar robot and human faces. Researchers were interested in examining whether robot or 
human stimuli activated the left hemifield of the brain, where the FFA is located. Results showed 
that control subjects showed increased activation when gazing at both human and robot faces, 
indicating activation in the FFA. In contrast, children with ASD only showed left hemifield 
activity when looking at robot faces and showed hypoactivation in response to human faces.  
Whyte et al. (2016), measured FFA activation when adolescents with ASD and controls 
viewed images of unfamiliar human faces, unfamiliar animal faces (cats and dogs), and common 
objects. NT participants showed equal activation of the FFA when looking at human and animal 
faces, in line with research which suggests that in the NT population, human and animal faces 
are processed similarly (Schirmer, Seow, & Penney, 2013). In contrast, those with ASD showed 
  
significant hypoactivation when processing human faces. However, those with ASD showed 
equivalent FFA activation for animal faces, in line with controls, and neither group showed 
activation when viewing objects. These findings were surprising considering research indicating 
aberrant gaze behaviors (Guillon et al., 2014) and poor emotional recognition (Gross, 2004) in 
young children with ASD when viewing both human and animal faces, and activation only in 
response to common objects when an item is not a specific restricted interest (Grelotti et al., 
2005).  
All three of these studies may offer support for the role of CIs in ToM for those with 
ASD, which contends that atypical stimuli may elicit activation in the brain typically reserved for 
social processing. For instance, the findings produced by Grelotti et al., (2005), which showed 
FFA activation in response to a preferred cartoon, could be seen as evidence that in ASD the 
FFA is engaged by restricted interests rather than faces. Similarly, increased FFA activation 
towards robot faces shown in Jung et al., (2016) may also reflect a heightened response towards 
a restricted interest, as individuals with ASD have been shown to have a fascination with 
mechanical systems (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).However, FFA activation in response to 
unfamiliar animal faces, as demonstrated by Whyte et al., (2016) and to a certain extent the 
unfamiliarity with the robot faces present in Jung et al., (2016), are not as easily explained by 
CIs. For one, in the Grelotti et al., (2005) study, participants were shown either human faces or 
whole-body representations of Digimon characters. In contrast, in both Whyte et al., (2016) and 
Jung et al., (2016) only facial stimuli was visible to participants. Thus, the whole-body details 
visible to the participant in Grelotti et al., (2005) could have led to increased focus on tertiary 
aspects of the cartoon that were of restricted interest. The focus on facial stimuli only in Whyte 
et al., (2016) and Jung et al., (2016) however limited the ability for participants to focus on 
  
aspects of the stimuli that may form a restricted interest category (mechanics, animals) which 
suggests that participants may have shown more interest specifically faces. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the known interest and familiarity with Digimon stimuli used by Grelotti et al., 
(2005), the images used in the other studies were unfamiliar. As evidence suggests that only 
items relating to specific restricted interests elicit affective neural responses in those with ASD 
(Cascio et al., 2014), the chances that the participants in each of the two study samples possessed 
a restricted interest in animal or robot faces may not entirely account for the FG activation found 
in these studies.  
Together, these studies provide some evidence that individuals with ASD may typically 
process anthropomorphic rather than human faces, and that the mechanisms underlying this 
processing be may not be entirely attributable to CIs. This is of interest when forming accounts 
of ASD, as it suggests that the FFA can be recruited towards general facial processing, but only 
when they take a non-human form. This may stem from a possible negative association towards 
specifically human faces, which has ties to SM. More broadly, these studies also form 
implications for accounts of anthropomorphism, as it is commonly assumed that 
anthropomorphism extends from a familiarity with the human self (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 
2010). In individuals with ASD however, it appears that anthropomorphism occurs in spite of a 
disengagement with human self-representations. With regard to the third tenet of 
anthropomorphism by Epley et al. (2007), this may mean that the anthropomorphizing of non-
human faces, indicative of facial recognition related FG activity, better elicits agent knowledge 
in this population. In other words, individuals with ASD become more anthropomorphic when 
agents are only human-like and are less anthropomorphic when they are human, indicating a 
closer identification with anthropomorphic creatures.  
  
Eye Gaze 
It is hypothesized that while the holistic processing of faces is a fundamental aspect of 
facial recognition (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000), it is the changeable interior 
aspects of the face may be the most informative of a person’s mental state (Hoffman & Haxby, 
2000). Eyes are arguably the most important facial features used for both mental state 
interpretation (Peterson & Eckstein, 2012) and are particularly implicated in facial recognition 
(Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002).  
Individuals with ASD have been shown to display marked differences in their attention to 
eyes compared to NT counterparts, which may be a crucial element of subsequent ToM 
impairments. For instance, studies have shown that individuals with ASD spend significantly less 
time attending to eyes when looking at faces (Riby & Hancock, 2009), and attend more to lower 
regions of the face, such as the mouth (Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008). Both tendencies are often 
cited as significant factors leading to their reduced ability to read emotions in eyes (Baron‐
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Senju & Johnson, 2009). Researchers such as 
Tanaka and Sung (2016) have put forth the “eye avoidance” theory of ASD, in which they posit 
that a lack of eye gaze is due to a heightened emotional arousal in response to eyes. Support for 
this theory can be found in Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Baudewig, and Heekeren (2012), who 
showed that individuals with ASD did not simply display an increased fixation towards lower 
facial elements such as the mouth, but rather an increased avoidance of eyes.  
It is also hypothesized that a reduced oxytocin neurohormonal release in response to 
human co-actors in individuals with ASD (Chaminade, Da Fonseca, et al., 2015) may make eye 
contact too sensitizing, as one of the purposes of oxytocin is to reduce anxiety during social 
engagement (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005). As research has also found 
  
that an administration of oxytocin attenuates neural reactivity when viewing eyes with 
threatening expressions (Kanat, Heinrichs, Schwarzwald, & Domes, 2015), and promotes eye 
gaze in individuals with and without ASD (Auyeung et al., 2015), it may be that those with the 
condition do not have the necessary neurohormonal priming that makes eye contact both 
efficient and rewarding.  
Critically, while gazing at human eyes may be uncomfortable for individuals with ASD, 
as is commonly reported by those with the condition (Grandin & Panek, 2013), this may not 
extend to anthropomorphic eyes. For instance, Grandgeorge, Degrez, Alavi, and Lemonnier 
(2016), compared the gaze patterns of NT children and those with ASD when viewing pictures of 
human, dog, cat and horse faces. While NT children spent more time looking at eyes in general 
compared to children with ASD, they spent the most time looking at human eyes. In contrast, 
children with ASD spent the most time looking at the eyes of dogs and cats and spent the least 
amount of time looking at human eyes. Saitovitch et al. (2013) also produced similar findings. 
children were assessed on their eye gaze patterns when looking at movies with cartoon and 
human characters. While children with ASD looked significantly less at human eyes compared to 
controls, they, in contrast, spent an equivalent amount of time looking at cartoon eyes. In this 
way, it may be that while eye gaze never reaches commensurate levels when compared to NT 
counterparts, eyes may be more salient when they are anthropomorphic.  
These findings may provide support for both the SM and CI aspects of ASD. For 
instance, with regard to CI, both animals and cartoons may pertain to a restricted interest for the 
individuals with ASD, which would explain longer looking times towards these stimuli. 
However, as these studies indicate increased attention towards anthropomorphic eyes, in 
  
particular, it may be that this type of stimuli does not result in the same degree of emotional 
dysregulation when returning the gaze and is thus more motivating (SM).  
In summary, it appears that individuals with ASD are more likely to anthropomorphize 
human-like rather than human faces. The three tenets of anthropomorphism outlined in Epley et 
al. (2007) may support this claim. For one, a need for sociality may cause individuals with ASD 
to see the social aspects of anthropomorphic characters in typical ways, and this same desire for 
sociality is not present to the same extent when stimuli are human. Second, it may be that a 
motivation to fully understand anthropomorphic creatures has led to typical face processing 
patterns with regard to these stimuli, particularly in studies demonstrating more typical gaze 
behaviors towards cartoon and animal eyes. As eyes are the most communicative of mental 
states, it may be that an increased interest in effectance with anthropomorphic stimuli motivates 
individuals with ASD to gaze at these types of eyes, while an interest in effectance is weakened 
when an agent is human. Third, it may be that disruptions of self-representations (Lombardo & 
Baron-Cohen, 2011), have developed into a greater familiarity with human-like rather than 
human stimuli.  
The next section will focus on another foundation of ToM processing, the detection, and 
recognition of biological motion. There is a significant body of research exploring biological 
motion recognition in ASD, which has largely concluded that from an early age individuals with 
the condition are not as sensitive to the movements of human agents. As will be discussed, this 
sensitivity may be intact relative to controls when individuals with ASD view anthropomorphic 
biological motion, particularly as development progresses.  
Biological Motion Processing  
  
While there are several reasons why anthropomorphic faces may be particularly salient to 
individuals with ASD, research indicates that anthropomorphic motion may also lead to 
enhanced social processing. An important element of ToM processing involves the recognition 
and processing of biological motion (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013), refers to the perception of 
sentient animacy, such as the smooth movements of a human as opposed to the jerky, artificial 
movements of a robot (Freitag et al., 2008). For instance, studies using point-light displays have 
demonstrated that by only showing several animated points meant to represent limbic movement, 
individuals are sensitive to points that are analogous with the human body (Johansson, 1973).  
One reason that biological motion is salient and informative with regard to ToM is that 
observing it enhances a person’s ability to make predictions about agent behavior (Koster-Hale 
& Saxe, 2013). For instance, human movements that violate biological laws, such as a finger 
bending sideways (Costantini et al., 2005), or a human making robotic movements (Saygin et al., 
2011), significantly disrupt a person’s ability to predict an agent’s future actions. Thus, 
sensitivity to biological motion is an important mechanism for ToM processing, as it alerts a 
person not only to agency but bolsters their ability for social action prediction.  
Early in development, infants prefer biological motion over artificial or scrambled motion 
(Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008), and prefer upright over inverted biological motion (Yoon & 
Johnson, 2009). By the age of two, they are shown to prefer human over non-human biological 
motion (Chaminade, Rosset, Da Fonseca, Hodgins, & Deruelle, 2015). As demonstrated by a 
person’s ability to infer emotions (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004), dispositions 
(Brownlow & Dixon, 1997), and intentions (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983) on the basis of 
biological motion alone, it is conjectured that recognizing mental states may substantially rely on 
perceptions of another’s motor system honed early in development (Pavlova, 2012).  
  
At a young age children with ASD are shown to be less sensitive to biological motion 
compared to NTs. For instance, young children with ASD do not differentiate between human 
and cartoon motion, nor do they prefer artificial or biological motion (Chaminade, Rosset, et al., 
2015). Young children with ASD are also not able to differentiate between biological or 
scrambled motion when presented in point-light displays (Wang, Chien, Hu, Chen, & Chen, 
2015). Interestingly, research indicates biological motion processing in ASD may be intact later 
in development when judging non-human biological motion. For instance, Rutherford and Troje 
(2012), compared adults with ASD to controls on a task using point light displays depicting 
human, cat and pigeon stimuli. While both groups showed an increased ability to recognize 
human, then feline, then pigeon motion in a point-light display, there were significant differences 
between groups in their judgments regarding the direction in which the stimuli were moving. 
While controls were better able to recognize the direction of human movements, those with ASD 
were, in fact, better able to determine the spatial direction of the pigeon. This is of particular 
interest in light of research which  indicates that perception of an agent’s spatial direction is 
analogous to their perceived level of animacy; when an individual struggles to orient to the 
direction of the stimuli, they are equally diminished in their perceptions of its animacy (Chang & 
Troje, 2008).  
Kaiser and Shiffrar (2012), measured adults with varying degrees of ASD traits on their 
sensitivity to human, dog and tractor motion. The magnitude of autistic traits negatively 
correlated with sensitivity to human motion alone. This suggests that deficits attending to and 
recognizing biological motion may be specifically impaired with regard to human motion; in 
contrast, the perception of anthropomorphic motion appears intact.  
  
Both SM and CIs patterns in ASD may be responsible for the insensitivity to human 
biological motion, and the possibly intact sensitivity to anthropomorphic biological motion. For 
instance, the propensity for NT individuals to “see human,” which underscores a sensitivity to 
human biological motion, may be indicative of increased neural reward activation when 
processing human movement. Individuals with ASD, who experience hypoactivation in reward 
systems when interacting with human stimuli (Chaminade, Da Fonseca, et al., 2015), may, 
therefore, be less primed to attend to human biological motion. Indeed, research asking 
participants with different degrees of ASD related traits to assign a value to forms with varying 
degrees of biological motion found that those with a higher degree of ASD related traits did not 
assign greater value to human biological motion (Williams & Cross, 2018).  
With regard to the CIs in ASD, it may also be that the motion of animate, non-human 
creatures, such as animals, represent motion which is more in line with restricted interests. For 
instance, individuals with ASD often show restricted interest in objects with mechanical 
movements (Turner-Brown et al., 2011). This may underlie individuals with ASD’s atypical 
attribution of “humanness” to non-biological, mechanical motion observed in androids 
(Kumazaki et al., 2017), which in NT’s is viewed as less salient and significantly disrupts action 
perception (Saygin et al., 2011). In this way, individuals with ASD may be both less sensitive to 
anomalies in human motion as they are less primed to process it preferentially (SM), and the 
atypicality of non-biological motion, which NTs find unnatural, are of heightened interest to 
individuals with ASD (CI).  
In summary, an important aspect of ToM is the recognition of biological motion, which 
indicates that the bodily movements of an agent are indicative of human action. Recognizing 
motion is indicative of human movement allows an individual to better form predictions 
  
regarding that agent’s intentions and goal-directed behaviors. Beginning at an early age, NT 
infants are sensitive to human biological motion. The same cannot be said of young children with 
ASD, who do not show a preference for either biological motion or human agency. This possibly 
extends throughout adulthood, though some research indicates that by adulthood individuals with 
ASD are better able to recognize human motion in line with NT adults, though there is some 
evidence that human biological motion recognition continues to be impaired (Kaiser & Pelphrey, 
2012). 
Interestingly, two studies indicate that biological motion detection and judgements 
regarding the direction of biological motion is not impaired in relation to animal motion; 
individuals with ASD related traits have been shown to be impaired only when attending to 
human not dog biological motion (Kaiser & Shiffrar, 2012), and those with ASD are best able to 
predict the direction of pigeon rather than human motion, to an even larger degree than controls 
(Chang & Troje, 2008). In this way, the processing and recognition of specifically human 
biological motion may be impaired, while perceptions of anthropomorphic motion may be intact. 
This may mean that individuals with ASD have developed a sensitivity for non-human motion in 
line with CI, and are less interested in human biological motion in line with SM.  
The finding that biological motion is enhanced when individuals with ASD view 
anthropomorphic stimuli may also correspond to the Epley et al., (2007) model of 
anthropomorphism in a similar fashion as findings on anthropomorphic face processing. In 
particular, an increased ability to anthropomorphize anthropomorphic versus human biological 
motion may indicate an enhanced social response towards anthropomorphic creatures, in line 
with the first tenet of sociality. In line with the second tenet of enhanced effectance, if animals 
represent a restricted interest, individuals with ASD may display a heightened interest in 
  
processing anthropomorphic stimuli efficiently, and are thus primed to detect anthropomorphic 
biological motion. The last of the Epley et al., (2007) tenets, which states that anthropomorphism 
occurs through eliciting agent knowledge, may be particularly at play in the processing of 
anthropomorphic biological motion in ASD. For instance, research indicates that the recognition 
of biological motion is enhanced when an individual is able to map physical aspects of animal 
motion through the use of a corresponding human reference (Welsh, McDougall, & Paulson, 
2014), such as relating the bipedal motion of a walking pigeon to that of a walking human figure. 
As a physical sensing of the self has been shown to be impaired in those with ASD (Lombardo et 
al., 2010) it may be that a diminished sense of personal motion may lead to a greater insensitivity 
to human motion, while not diminishing a sensitivity to anthropomorphic motion. Indeed, if 
individuals with ASD are more attune to animal rather than human stimuli, as research suggests 
(Celani, 2002; Prothmann, Ettricht, & Prothmann, 2009), it may be that elicited agent knowledge 
in this population takes a more anthropomorphic rather than human form. In the next section, 
findings relating to increased engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli in individuals with ASD 
and how this related to ToM is discussed.  
Increased Engagement with Anthropomorphic  Stimuli and Theory of Mind 
It is suggested throughout this review that, be it facial processing or recognition of 
biological motion, individuals must experience some type interest in a stimulus in order to 
process it socially. This is also reflected in Epley et al., (2007), who cites a desire for sociality to 
be the most important determinant of anthropomorphism. Thus, an underlying argument in this 
review is that individuals with ASD find anthropomorphic stimuli more socially motivating than 
human stimuli, which underlies their enhanced social processing of such stimuli. 
  
Silva, Da Fonseca, Esteves, and Deruelle (2015) directly tested individuals with ASD on 
their broader engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli. Adolescents and adults with ASD and 
age-matched controls were tested on their reaction times when performing the Approach-
Avoidance Task (Rinck & Becker, 2007). In this task, the participants’ approach or avoidance of 
either cartoon or human photographed images were measured by the speed in which they 
manipulated pictures of emotionally positive, negative and neutral social scenes through either 
the pushing (minimizing image) or pulling (enlarging) of a joystick. Results showed that unlike 
NTs, those with ASD were significantly more avoidant of emotionally positive real photographs, 
and in contrast found emotionally positive cartoons significantly more approachable. It may be 
that the heightened anthropomorphism seen in this population towards anthropomorphic stimuli 
is reflective of a desire for sociality, a need which may not be met with traditionally human 
stimuli.  
In a study that more closely examined anthropomorphic agents and their effect on ToM, 
NT and ASD adolescents were tested on their ability to recognize emotional expressions in three 
types of media (still images, dynamic images, & auditory noise) across human and cartoon 
stimuli (Brosnan, Johnson, Grawmeyer, Chapman, & Benton, 2015). Results showed that NT 
adolescents were superior to those with ASD in emotion recognition of human stimuli across all 
three modalities. This, however, did not extend to animated (cartoon) stimuli. In fact, not only 
did individuals with ASD significantly improve within group scores on emotion recognition 
when viewing cartoon versus human stimuli, they outperformed controls in the recognition of 
static cartoon stimuli. However, it is important to note that accuracy for animated stimuli in the 
ASD group was never as high as accuracy for human stimuli in the NT group, indicating that 
cartoon presentation does not entirely compensate for relative ToM-related deficits.  
  
One finding of particular interest related to differences regarding the processing strategies 
between groups. The researchers found that in the control group, emotion recognition for cartoon 
and human stimuli were correlated, meaning that the strategies used by controls in one modality 
were similarly utilized in others. However, no such correlations were found within the ASD 
group. This indicates that the manner in which individuals with ASD were processing cartoon 
stimuli was not employed when processing human images, indicating that cartoon stimuli were 
viewed as “special” while human stimuli were not.  
The above research suggests that engagement and motivation with regard to 
anthropomorphic stimuli could ameliorate ToM deficits for those with ASD. One study that 
tested this was conducted by Golan et al. (2010), and explored whether anthropomorphizing non-
human agents could lead to transferable gains in human ToM. In this study, children with ASD 
aged 4-7 engaged in a four-week intervention in which they watched instructional ToM videos 
acted out by toy vehicles grafted with real faces. Following the intervention, the children were 
assessed in relation to two control groups, one with ASD who did not partake in the intervention 
and one without ASD who did not partake, on their ability to generalize learned facial 
expressions and utilize emotional vocabulary. Results indicated that while the experimental 
group was indistinguishable from the control ASD group at pre-test, by post-test they had 
improved to the level of the control group on all four measures. Central to these findings was the 
children’s demonstrated ability to generalize content to not only novel anthropomorphic stimuli 
but novel human stimuli. This indicates that the intrinsic interest individuals with ASD showed 
towards areas of restricted interest may have promoted their interest and understanding in human 
stimuli.  
  
In relation to the Epley et al.,(2007) model, anthropomorphic stimuli may enhance 
sociality, increase the desire for effectance, and is not viewed as incongruent with the physical 
self. The following section will focus on the second tenet of the model, in which it is found that a 
desire for efficacy promotes anthropomorphism. Studies documenting an increased desire for 
efficacy in individuals with ASD when processing anthropomorphic characters due to 
stylization/exaggeration, and extensive previous experiences with such stimuli, will be explored.  
Effectance with Stylization/Exaggeration 
As previously discussed, research indicates that individuals anthropomorphize in order to 
increase their efficacy in understanding a non-human entity and this is enhanced when behavior 
is less predictable (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). One aspect of anthropomorphic stimuli that 
may particularly increase effectance of individuals with ASD is the stylization and exaggeration 
of social features in such agents, which may highlight a sense of unpredictability regarding their 
intentions. Support for this comes from research showing that within this population the 
recognition of changes in emotion may be impaired, while the perception of changes in motion is 
intact (Han, Tijus, Le Barillier, & Nadel, 2015). This may mean that the exaggerated movements 
used by anthropomorphic characters to express emotions may be more noticeable to those with 
the condition, while changes in emotion may be missed and thus not utilized when making 
judgments of unpredictability which influence a desire for effectance. 
Research on animal movement, for instance, indicates that individuals largely rely on 
physical movements, such as the motion of the tail and muzzle cues like the baring teeth, when 
identifying an animal’s mental state (Tami & Gallagher, 2009). In this way, individuals with 
ASD may be better equipped to attend to animal emotion, as it involves the interpretation of 
overt movement rather than subtle changes in facial expression. In this way, the unpredictability 
  
of animal agents may be more noticeable, thus leading to a greater desire for effectance. Cartoon 
characters are also characterized by exaggerated motion (Thomas, Johnston, & Thomas, 1995), 
which serves to direct attention toward socially relevant aspects of the animation (Gielniak & 
Thomaz, 2012). In a similar way to animal agents, individuals with ASD may be more primed to 
attend to the unpredictability of cartoon motion as it is exaggerated and thus more salient. 
Carter, Hyde, Williams, and Hodgins (2016) provides preliminary support for the 
hypothesis that exaggerated motion in anthropomorphic stimuli increases interest in effectance. 
In this study, children with ASD interacted with animated avatars with varying degrees of facial 
emotional exaggeration. When an avatar showed exaggerated facial motion, compared to 
dampened or realistic motion, nonverbal behaviors such as gaze or gesturing significantly 
increased. This is in line with research showing that individuals with ASD are less impaired 
when interpreting overt emotional expressions, and struggle more with the detection of subtle 
facial emotional changes (Rump et al., 2009). In this way, anthropomorphic faces, which 
exaggeration makes more emotionally intense (Hyde, Carter, Kiesler, & Hodgins, 2014), may 
heighten their unpredictability and lead to a greater desire for effectance, while subtle changes in 
realistic human agents are less salient, and result in a decreased desire for effectance.  
Effectance from cartoon and animal experience 
Cartoon Experience  
An important aspect of the desire for effectance brought up in Epley et al. (2007) is that it 
involves a desire for ‘closure’ or understanding of an agent. One reason that individuals with 
ASD may anthropomorphize cartoon stimuli more than human stimuli is that familiarity with this 
form of stimuli has led to an increased sense of self-efficacy in understanding such stimuli.  
Heightened interest and time spent attending to animated stimuli is well documented in this 
  
population. For instance, survey data shows that adolescents with ASD spend a significant 
amount of time engaging with electronic screen media (Mazurek, Shattuck, Wagner, & Cooper, 
2012). Surveys given to parents of children with ASD indicate that electronic screen engagement 
is their most common leisure activity, and in particular children favored animated television 
shows and movies (Shane & Albert, 2008). Kuo et al., (2014) also found that within a sample of 
adolescents with ASD, cartoon television programs were the most popular television genre, and 
66% of the sample reported a preference for animation over any other type of media.  
Drawing a causal relation between cartoon viewing and increased ToM abilities with 
regard to cartoon stimuli remains ambiguous. As has been discussed previously in this review, 
there are reasons why the stylized exaggeration inherent to animated media may attract 
individuals with ASD to this medium. For one, the exaggeration and amplified motion may allow 
for greater success when making ToM judgments, leading to enhanced self-efficacy and thus 
greater enjoyment of this type of media. As individuals with ASD report increased familiarity 
and exposure to this form of media, it may be that they have an increased expertise in processing 
cartoon stimuli, which has led to the type of FFA activation that enhances ToM related 
processing. This may increase a desire for effectance in relation to cartoons, as individuals with 
ASD may feel better equipped to understand the meaning behind the social acts depicted in 
cartoon form due to their increased exposure, thus increasing their tendency to anthropomorphize 
(Epley et al., 2007).  
Animal Experience  
Individuals with ASD also show increased motivation and experience regarding animal 
stimuli. For instance, Celani (2002) compared children with ASD to NTs, and those with 
intellectual disabilities, on their preferences for human, animal and object stimuli. While children 
  
with ASD significantly preferred objects over human stimuli, they showed a significantly greater 
preference for animals than all other types of stimuli. Prothmann et al., (2009) showed children 
with ASD interacted significantly more frequently and for a longer duration with a dog than a 
person or toy, given the choice.  This provides evidence of a preference in individuals with ASD 
for animal stimuli, which may motivate attention to animals over humans. 
With regard to animal experience, it is estimated that 1 in 4 children with ASD has 
participated in animal therapy at some point, and two-thirds of parents report improvements 
following animal-assisted interventions (Christon, Mackintosh, & Myers, 2010). Research also 
indicates that families of children with ASD may have a higher rate of pet ownership, as 81% of 
families with a child with ASD surveyed on pet ownership reported owning pets (Carlisle, 2014), 
while the national average is around 66% according to the American Veterinary Medical 
Association (2012). Further findings in this study indicated that 94% of children with ASD were 
described by parents as having bonded with their pets, with common bonding activities including 
talking and actively playing and petting their pets. Parents commonly reported that they believed 
pets provided specific benefits to their children with regard to alleviating common challenges 
related to ASD, and 26% of parents reported that the perceived benefits of animal contact 
factored into their decision to own a pet, particularly dogs. Surveys of individuals with ASD also 
indicates strong perceived attachments between themselves and their pets (Carlisle, 2015). 
Together, these results indicate that not only do individuals with ASD commonly have 
extensive contact with animals but that these encounters are viewed quite positively by both 
themselves and close others. Given that individuals with ASD often report a significantly high 
degree of negative social experiences (Lamport & Turner, 2014; White, Ollendick, & Bray, 
2011), and decreased social self-efficacy (Vickerstaff et al., 2007), successful encounters with 
  
animals may increase a desire for effectance, as previous positive encounters with animals have 
incentivized understanding animal agents (Epley et al., 2007). 
Considering this evidence, it appears that individuals with ASD on average tend to have 
frequent and positive experiences interacting with animals and cartoons, either through media 
engagement, structured animal-assisted interventions, pet-ownership, or all three. In this way, the 
positive social experiences individuals with ASD have had with regard to anthropomorphic 
agents may lead to greater motivation to interact effectively with such stimuli. As individuals 
with ASD have experienced social rewards associated in particular with animal engagement, 
anthropomorphizing animals may happen out of a desire to further understand and predict the 
behavior of this stimuli. Additionally, a heightened exposure to cartoons may lead individuals 
with ASD to view understanding the mental states of cartoons as within their control. In contrast, 
it may be that individuals with ASD view the processing of human stimuli as less in their control, 
and they show decreased anthropomorphism for human agents.  
Summary 
The processing of mental states is a complex, multi-faceted procedure that requires 
lower-level inputs in order to reason about higher-order explanations involved in ToM. 
Individuals with ASD have been shown to struggle with ToM throughout development, and 
evidence suggests that lower-level processing impairments such as reduced facial and biological 
motion processing may play a significant role in this disruption. In particular, it appears that 
individuals with ASD have early insensitivities to human agency, namely attending to human 
faces and human biological motion.  
While evidence suggests that individuals with ASD show significant deficits in relation to 
recognizing and processing human stimuli, they are conversely shown to display a heightened 
  
interest in non-social stimuli compared to NTs. The SM and CI aspects of ASD complement one 
another in their explanations of these deficits. In relation to SM, early deficits in relation to 
human social processing, which primes NTs to preferentially attend to such stimuli through an 
associated neural reward system, is impaired in those with ASD. This may lead to decreased 
reward circuitry, and thus less holistic and preferential processing of human stimuli, which 
impairs ToM processing at lower levels of input. Additionally, the preference individuals with 
ASD show towards non-social stimuli (CI), particularly objects in the environment that have 
ordered motion, likely reflect a preference to attend to items of restricted interests in place of 
social stimuli. In this way, the increased motivation to attend to non-social stimuli may impact 
the motivation to attend to less-ordered, more complex social stimuli.  
However, the many studies detailed in this review indicate that engagement with 
anthropomorphic stimuli may function as a bridge for individuals with ASD to attend to social 
stimuli. In line with SM, it is hypothesized that the developed stressors associated with human 
contact may not extend to human-like stimuli. In this way, individuals with ASD may be more 
motivated to attend to anthropomorphic stimuli in typical ways, as anthropomorphic stimuli 
feature properties that differentiate them from purely human agents. It is also hypothesized that 
as individuals with ASD are able to attend to motion, and struggle with the nuances of emotion, 
an ability to decode animal and cartoon emotion using overt movement cues could make social 
processing less difficult, thereby enhancing SM. The frequent exposure to cartoons and animal 
agents may also serve to enhance motivational engagement with such stimuli.  
Also playing an important role in anthropomorphic social processing is found in aspects 
of CIs in those with ASD. Properties of anthropomorphic agents that correspond to restricted 
interests, including stylized physical properties and an association with an exaggerated motion, 
  
may direct attention to these agents over and above agents that are purely human. For instance, 
individuals with ASD report an enhanced interest and experience with cartoon stimuli, and the 
overt, exaggerated aspects of cartoon motion may be particularly salient. In this way, 
anthropomorphic agents may represent an area of expertise for individuals with ASD, therefore 
enhancing their ability to attend to them holistically.  
For these reasons, it is suggested that while the social processing of human stimuli 
appears to be impaired in this population, the processing of anthropomorphic stimuli is either 
less pronounced, intact or even enhanced. Thus, using anthropomorphic stimuli to develop social 
processing in individuals with ASD may help ameliorate both the lack of motivation associated 
with human stimuli. It may also help engage individuals with ASD in the processing of social 
over non-social stimuli, as anthropomorphic creatures are social agents, yet they also possess 
physical characteristics reminiscent of restricted, non-social interests. The implications of these 
findings are discussed below. 
Implications 
There are several important implications for the increased social processing of 
anthropomorphic stimuli in individuals with ASD. Chief among them is the possibility that 
increasing social cognitive development in relation to anthropomorphic stimuli may serve as a 
scaffold for transferring these skills to human stimuli. There is some evidence that supports this 
claim. For instance, recall, Golan et al., (2010) showed that improvements understanding mental 
state language in connection to anthropomorphic characters transferred to social gains with 
human stimuli. This indicates that the use of areas of CI when combined with human elements 
may help improve ToM when interacting with non-CI related agents.  
  
Research on animal-assisted interventions such as equine therapy indicates that skills 
learned with animal agents transferred to real life social improvements even when measured one-
month post-trial (Gabriels et al., 2015). Studies measuring naturalistic social improvements also 
show that in the presence of animals, real-life social functioning can improve, and importantly 
lead to greater peer acceptance (O'Haire, McKenzie, Beck, & Slaughter, 2013). These studies 
indicate that the enhanced social processing, and the motivation experienced by individuals in 
relation to anthropomorphic stimuli, may transfer to improvements in human interactions. 
Perhaps most significant is the possibility that perceived self-efficacy with 
anthropomorphic stimuli can lead to gains in perceived self-efficacy in relation to humans, and 
human encounters. Underlying the “eye avoidance” hypothesis of ASD (Tanaka & Sung, 2016) 
is that individuals with ASD develop gaze aversion in relation to human contact, as they may 
implicitly equate eye gaze with social demands that they cannot meet. For instance, evidence 
shows that in preschool there is not the same aversion to mutual gaze and emotional 
dysregulation in children with ASD (Nuske, Vivanti, & Dissanayake, 2015), and two-year-old 
children with ASD show eye indifference rather than eye avoidance, as they can be primed to 
view eyes (Moriuchi, Klin, & Jones, 2016).  
However, research also indicates that in adults with ASD there is a distinct aversion to 
direct eye-gaze (Kliemann et al., 2012), and that direct eye gaze results in hyperactivation in 
subcortical areas of the brain, indicating dysregulation (Hadjikhani et al., 2017). This may 
indicate that early eye indifference later results in eye avoidance, leading to a possibility that 
commensurate with age, individuals with ASD may develop a human-specific social aversion. In 
contrast, early eye insensitivity may not impact individuals with ASD’s perceived self-efficacy 
with anthropomorphic agents. In this way, the negative associations that may impede further 
  
development of social processing in relation to human stimuli may not interfere with 
development in regard to anthropomorphic social processing. This reflects theories of ASD 
relating to social compensation (Livingston & Happé, 2017), and it may be that the difficulties 
associated with human agents are compensated for when interacting with non-human agents. 
With regard to compensation, it may be that an ability to process anthropomorphic social 
cues creates a pathway to developing social processing competencies, and this may be a bridge to 
developing competencies with human stimuli. For instance, research indicates that the same 
brain regions are recruited when individuals use ToM in relation to animals as they do in relation 
to humans (Desmet, van der Wiel, & Brass, 2017), and those facial expressions in both animals 
and humans are processed similarly (Schirmer et al., 2013). Interestingly, research indicates that 
when assessing the emotions of dogs, individuals often used their own emotions as a template 
(Konok, Nagy, & Miklósi, 2015). In this way, engagement with mentalizing about animals may 
lead to increased processing of personal emotions, which has been shown to be impaired in 
individuals with ASD (Jackson, Skirrow, & Hare, 2012), and thus may be an important 
mechanism for ToM improvement (Allan, Morson, Dixon, Martin, & Cunningham, 2017). 
Effective reasoning about anthropomorphic social agents may, therefore, transfer to efficacy with 
human agents and even efficacy in understanding the self.  
There are several implications for interventions with regard to enhanced social processing 
for anthropomorphism. One is that, in line with Golan et al. 2010, it may be advantageous to use 
anthropomorphic stimuli when engaging individuals with ASD in ToM interventions. In 
particular, future interventions of this nature should focus on scaffolding, and slowly applying 
strategies toward more human-like stimuli presentations. It is also of interest to examine how 
  
longitudinal interventions with anthropomorphic stimuli may differentially affect what may be a 
developed aversion to human stimuli in older individuals with ASD.  
In particular, O’Haire et al., (2013) indicates that interactions with animals by both 
children with ASD and NTs in a classroom setting enhance social reciprocity. It may be that 
structuring inclusive classroom settings to involve animal contact may improve social outcomes 
for individuals with ASD and foster greater peer acceptance. This may help counteract some of 
the negative social experiences often reported by individuals with ASD, and lead to greater self-
efficacy in relation to social encounters. In closing, experiential accounts from individuals with 
ASD often report attachment and elevated self-esteem in relation to anthropomorphic agents, 
particularly animals. It may be that anthropomorphism for this population allows those with ASD 
to experience social engagement in a way that feels more natural, and thus can aid in transferable 
ToM gains to other social settings.  
In closing, the Epley et al. (2007) model of anthropomorphism uses three tenets to 
explain why people anthropomorphize. It is suggested that individuals with ASD may use 
anthropomorphic creatures as a social outlet of sorts, and in this way, a desire to see the social 
aspects of anthropomorphic creatures leads to better holistic processing of this stimuli. 
Individuals with ASD may also have a greater desire to understand anthropomorphic creatures, 
as they have had success understanding and interacting with such agents, and the agents have 
properties related to CIs, which enhances a desire for effectance. Additionally, a decreased 
salience for humans and an increased salience for anthropomorphic characters, perhaps tied to 
exaggerated motion and a poor detection of emotion, may lead to a stronger recognition of 
unpredictability, thus enhancing a desire for effectance with anthropomorphic creatures. Finally, 
individuals with ASD have a diminished physical sense of self and are less sensitive to 
  
anomalies in the human form. While this impedes anthropomorphizing non-human creatures in 
those with NT, this may not lead to the same types of processing deficits in individuals with 
ASD. Conversely, the aspects of the physical self that, in individuals with ASD, are less salient 
or noticeable, may lead to a heightened identification with other “less human” and more 
exaggerated stimuli.  
At present, investigations into anthropomorphism have found that ToM impairments 
correspond to impairments anthropomorphizing (Cullen et al., 2014). It may be of interest to 
examine whether this is unilaterally the case with individuals with ASD. For instance, research 
shows that in anthropomorphic assessments using animated shapes, individuals with ASD are 
less able to anthropomorphize (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000). However, it may be that with more 
socially enriched stimuli, such as animal or human cartoon stimuli, individuals with ASD may 
display a different pattern with regard to anthropomorphism and ToM. Additionally, as is 
explored by Brosnan et al., (2015), deficits relating to ToM may be ameliorated when stimuli 
take a less human form. It would be of particular interest to test whether this can be replicated, 
particularly through the use of non-visual ToM paradigms, in order to assess the purely cognitive 
aspects of mental state representations and their connection with anthropomorphism and ToM in 
this population. It would also be of interest to further understand how anthropomorphism and 
self-perceptions interact in ASD, and whether anthropomorphism can serve as a pathway for 
improving personal as well as interpersonal social processing, and ToM more generally. 
In conclusion we have highlighted how the ability to anthropomorphize may not only be 
intact in those with ASD, but those with the condition may even display a particular affinity for 
seeing human in the non-human. Evidence suggests that ToM abilities, which are usually 
disrupted in this population, may be ameliorated, spared, or even enhanced when they are 
  
directed towards anthropomorphic rather than human agents. As we have shown, 
anthropomorphizing may be a potential scaffold for improving ToM abilities more generally in 
this population, as they correspond with a number of strengths intrinsic to ASD. Identifying and 
capitalizing on such strengths may be the key to developing better ToM, and a more general 
interest in the wider social world. 
 
I moved full circle form being a wild thing out of context as a child, to being a wild thing in context with a 
family of gorillas, who taught me how to be civilized. They taught me the beauty of being wild and gentle 
together as one (Prince-Hughes, 2004, p. 1). 
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